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International rice markets are seen as volatile due to the thin nature of the market
which is believed to be exacerbated by a low level of substitution between major
rice export markets. In other words, this perceived lack of price transmission amongst
international rice markets is believed to further thin out an already thin world rice
market. The paper tests for price transmission between five major rice exporting
markets representing Asia and the Americas over the past decade. It uses a vector
autoregressive framework and performs Granger and Toda-Yamamoto causality tests
and generalized impulse response functions to interpret the model’s results. The find-
ings suggest that price transmission exists across these major rice export markets
with price relations being the most widespread between Asian markets. Furthermore,
the direction of price transmission suggests that Asian prices act as price leaders for
North and South American prices. While it is not clear whether there is a price leader
amongst the Asian export markets, Vietnam has the most extensive price relations
with other export markets which would suggest that the Vietnamese rice export
price is a more suitable world reference price than the Thai export price. An implica-
tion of the presence of price relations between rice export markets is that the world
rice market is not as fragmented as generally perceived in the literature. However, it
can also explain why international rice prices are so sensitive to the volatile trading
behavior of major markets.
Keywords: Rice export markets; Price transmission; Causality tests; Impulse response
functions; World reference priceBackground
The world rice market is seen as a thin market which is used to explain its volatile na-
ture (Siamwalla and Haykin, 1983; Gibson, 1994; Wailes, 2002; Nielsen, 2003; Wailes,
2005; Headey, 2011; and Rapsomanikis, 2011). Two explanations are usually given for
why it is a thin market. Firstly, it has been pointed out that the proportion of world
rice production traded internationally represents just seven percent of the market
(Wailes, 2005; Headey, 2011). In such an event, prices do not reflect the supply and de-
mand conditions of the market (Tomek and Robinson, 1990), it increases search costs
and can lead to excessive price volatility (Anderson et al. 2007). The second argument
given is that international rice markets have a low level of substitution (Petzel and
Monke, 1980; Siamwalla and Haykin, 1983 Rastegari-Henneberry, 1985; Cramer et al.
1993; Jayne, 1993; Chan, 1997, Wailes, 2005; Dawe, 2008) which fragments the world
market into even smaller unrelated markets and makes it harder to discover price in-
formation (Jayne, 1993).John; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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rice markets to be weak with little price transmission taking place across different geo-
graphical rice markets. The behavior of international rice prices and trade, however,
would suggest that rice markets must be related to some extent, at least in contempor-
ary times. Firstly, the huge surge in international rice prices in 2007-2008 was felt
worldwide which transmitted over to most Asian, African and Latin American domes-
tic markets (Demeke et al. 2011). Secondly, major rice exporting nations are competing
in some of the same markets, particularly in Africa and parts of Latin Americaa.
The aim of this study is to test to what extent international rice markets are related
to each other by measuring price transmission using the monthly export rice prices of
five major markets taken from FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System
database. The prices are specified into a vector auto regression (VAR) model and the
results are interpreted using Granger and Toda-Yamamoto causality tests as well as
generalized impulse response functions (IRF). The causality tests are used to verify
whether price transmission exists between several major rice export markets from Asia
and the Americas. Furthermore, generalized impulse response functions are simulated
to provide information on the magnitude and persistence of the price transmission
which takes place between international rice markets. Understanding the extent of
price relations between international rice markets gives an indication of how well the
world rice market functions and even whether it is appropriate to view international
rice markets as a single market. It also gives an idea of how competitive exporting
countries are and since the causality tests can indicate the direction of price transmis-
sion, the testing procedure can also provide an insight into whether there are certain
markets which act as price leaders.
Rice exporting nations are often reported to distort their export prices in order to
stabilize their own domestic markets (Dorosh, 2009; Gilbert and Morgan, 2010; Tim-
mer, 2010; Dawe and Slayton, 2011; Demeke, et al. 2011; Headey, 2011). Headey (2011)
and Gilbert (2013) both believe such behavior played a major role in the huge price
hikes seen in international rice prices and more recently, the perceived unreliability of
international rice markets has led to the promotion of rice self sufficiency polices in
many traditional rice importing countries under the guise of national food security
(Stage and Rekve, 1998; Chand, 2006; Xiufang and Dwyer, 2008; Seck et al. 2010;
Demeke et al. 2011). A problem with these policies is that they are expected to make
the world rice market even thinner and therefore more volatile (Jayne (1993; Wailes,
2005). If export prices are found to be related then it would suggest that exporting na-
tions are to some extent responsive to the market’s price movements and therefore not
as price distortive as perceived.
The study not only tests for the existence of price transmission between international
rice markets but also the direction of price transmission. The direction is also of inter-
est as this information can provide further insights such as whether there exists a suit-
able reference price for the world rice price. International organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) tend to use the Thai export FOB price as a proxy
for the world rice price which is sensible since Thailand is traditionally the largest rice
exporter. The estimation procedure of this study also allows for testing whether the
Thai price is a suitable proxy or whether international rice prices are too isolated and
fragmented for there to be a credible world rice price.
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There are numerous varieties of rice which are consumed and traded; however, conven-
tional indica varieties make up 85 per cent of world rice consumption and 80 per cent
of world rice trade (Jayne, 1993; Dawe, 2008). The general view has been that prices of
the different rice varieties, such as indica and japonica markets are unrelated (Petzel
and Monke, 1980; Siamwalla and Haykin, 1983 Rastegari-Henneberry, 1985; Dawe,
2008). However, Falcon and Monke (1980) expected indica prices between Asian and
American export markets to be integrated and Dawe (2008) also expected these mar-
kets were strongly related throughout the 1980s. In more contemporary times however,
Dawe (2008) believes that American and Asian indica rice markets act more like two
separate commodity markets which he argues can be explained by the fact that the US
does not export rice to Asian markets.
Testing for price transmission under a market integration framework using cointegra-
tion tests has been a common practice in the literature. However, most studies related
to rice markets have focused on testing for price transmission between international
and domestic rice markets in order to assess how integrated domestic rice markets are
with international markets. However, Ghoshray (2008) used this approach to test for
price relations between two major rice export markets and found evidence which sug-
gested that Thailand and Vietnam’s export prices were asymmetrically cointegrated.
That is to say that although their prices share a long-run relationship, price transmis-
sion is asymmetric, which is a sign of uncompetitive behavior. He found the prices to
be asymmetric in the sense that price adjustments occur faster when the price differen-
tials are in decline rather than when they are increasing. In addition, Ghoshray (2008)
looked for whether there was a rice price leader between Thailand and Vietnam. He
concluded that Thailand acts as a price leader for higher quality grades but also re-
sponds to Vietnamese price movements to some extent in the short-run.
Using causality tests and IRFs to interpret the results of a VAR model for assessing
price transmission between Thailand’s domestic and export rice markets, John (2013)
found price transmission to be bi-directional. However, the magnitude and persistence
of price transmission based on the IRF results between the two markets was found to
vary substantially, suggesting that although Thailand’s paddy pledging program distorts
prices and hinders price transmission between Thai domestic and export prices in the
short-run to some extent, Thai export price movements eventually transmit through to
domestic prices substantially.
Methods
Research focused on measuring price transmission between spatial markets has most
often been concerned with testing for market integration which uses the Law of One
Price (LOP) as a theoretical framework. LOP asserts that at all points of time the rela-
tionship between two markets is as follows:
p1t ¼ cþ p2t ð1Þ
where due to instantaneous competitive arbitrage the price differential between market
p1 and market p2 at time t is the transfer cost (c) of the product to each of the mar-
ketsb. The notion stated in equation (1) is a strong form of market integration since
markets deviating from this are considered not to be integrated and therefore no price
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grated and full transmission takes place. A weaker form of LOP allows the price rela-
tionship to be as follows:
p2t−p1tj j≤c ð2Þ
where the price differential between markets may be less than the transfer cost but effi-
cient arbitrage will not allow the deviation to exceed the transfer cost. Equation (2) is
less restrictive in the sense that transmission can take place even when the price differ-
ential is less than the transfer cost and suggests an equilibrium condition.
p2t−p1tj j ¼ c ð3Þ
One might expect the condition in equation (3) to occur in the long run since traderswould leave the market if price deviations did not cover the transfer cost. However, the
condition in equation (2) can occur at least in the short run. This is essentially relaxing
the assumption of instantaneous arbitrage. In terms of price transmission, this may
mean that while transmission may not take place fully in the short run between inte-
grated markets, full transmission would be expected to occur in the long run. In the
context of price transmission, cointegration can be seen as the empirical equivalent of
the theoretical concept of a weaker form of LOP, where it is accepted that while price
transmission does not adjust instantly, in the long run the full extent of the transmis-
sion takes place. However, the traditional linear cointegration tests have been criticized
because they do not consider the existence of non-stationary transfer costs. Ghoshray
(2008) overcomes this criticism by using threshold autoregressive (TAR) models which
allow for asymmetric error corrections in the cointegration tests.
This study adopts less restrictive estimation techniques for measuring price transmis-
sion, namely causality tests and impulse response functions. While testing for cointe-
gration is a common procedure, the more conventional cointegration methods are
rather restrictive as they require all of the price series to be I(1) non-stationary pro-
cesses. Cointegration techniques have also been criticized as not being suitable tools
for measuring market integration on several grounds including the fact that they do
not consider the trade behavior of countries (Barrett and Li, 2002). One of the largest
concerns with the LOP framework is that transfer costs between markets can be so
great that it does not seem appropriate to test for market integration but instead simply
test to see whether markets have in fact any price relationship. Transportation is per-
haps the most obvious transfer cost which affects price transmission; however the fac-
tor which has been given the most attention in the literature, when assessing spatial
markets, is border and domestic policies (Conforti, 2004). Conforti (2004) sees product
homogeneity, that is to say, the level of substitutability between products across differ-
ent markets, to be particularly important to world rice markets. If rice markets have a
high level of differentiation, prices across markets are likely to differ substantially.
Other key factors considered important to spatial price transmission are: transaction
costs, exchange rates, market power, and increasing returns to scale in production
(Conforti, 2004; Ghoshray, 2011; Gilbert, 2011). In this study, the aim is not to test for
market integration but merely provide some insight into the competiveness of major
rice export markets by testing whether their price movements are related.
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A VAR is a system of equations which is rooted in the Box-Jenkins procedure. It presumes
that the best way of predicting movements in x are the past values of x as well as the past
values of other variables. Since no restrictions are made in the system, everything is assumed
to affect everything and there are no endogeneity issues since there are no contemporaneous
explanatory variables. Its simplicity makes it an attractive model as compared to the trad-
itional structural equation models which demand sound economic theory surrounding the
relationship between the studied variables. The absence of a solid theoretical background
linking the variables within the VAR system has also been regarded as a critical weakness of
the model which has led to the popularity of restricted VAR models. For this study, it is felt
that there should be no restrictions on the relations between any of the export prices as the
assumption that all of the prices affect one another is sensible if the markets are competitive.
Therefore, specifying a restricted VAR would be inappropriate in this case.
The equations of the VAR are estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) pro-
cedure therefore all price series within the system must be stationary processes other-
wise the OLS assumptions are violated. Knowledge about the stationarity of the price
series is therefore required. If the prices are stationary then the price series can enter
the VAR system in their level form. However, if any of the prices are non-stationary,
the series will need to be first-differenced before they can enter the VAR system in
order to ensure the OLS assumption of stationarity is not violated. As an example, a
simple 2 × 2 VAR can be specified as follows:




i¼1θ1ixt−i þ u1t ð4Þ




i¼1θ2ixt−i þ u2t ð5Þ
where equation (4) specifies the export price of country y as a function of its own past price
values up to k lags, the past values of the export price of country x up to k lags and a white
noise error term (u1). Equation (5) specifies the same explanatory variables for country x.
Causality tests
In the Granger sense, causality is the ability of past values of x predicting the contemporan-
eous movements in y. If this holds, x can be said to Granger-cause y. Within the field of price
transmission, this can be seen as the ability of the past price movements of one market pre-
dicting the contemporaneous movements of another price. The Granger causality test is ba-
sically an autoregressive specification of y where the past values of another variable, x, are
added to the autoregressive equation. In other words, it tests whether the removal of the lags
of x from the autoregressive equation leads to a loss of information which explains the
current movements in y. The Granger test is essentially a Wald test which restricts all of the
lags of the explanatory variable we are interested in to zero within the autoregressive equa-
tion. For equations 4 and 5 the null and alternative hypotheses (H0 and Ha) are as follows:
H10 : θ11 ¼ θ12 ¼⋯ ¼ θ1k ¼ 0;H1a : At least one θ1 is not zero
H20 : φ21 ¼ φ22 ¼⋯ ¼ φ1k ¼ 0;H2a : At least one φ2 is not zero
In this example, one could infer that a rejection of H10 and H20 suggests there is bi-directional transmission between the export prices while failing to reject H10 and H20
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would suggest that prices only transmit unidirectionally from export price x to export
price y, while rejecting H20 and not H10 would suggest the opposite.
If the Granger causality tests are performed on the first-differences of the price series
then the tests provide information on the relationship between the price changes and
can be seen as short run price transmission since the long run information is taken out
of the price series when they are first-differenced. There is, however, another causality
test which can be performed even if the system of equations includes non-stationary
processes. The Toda-Yamamoto causality test is similar to the Granger test but has the
advantage of allowing non-stationary series to be included in the test procedure there-
fore the series do not need to be first-differenced. This means that the series contain
their long-run information so the Toda-Yamamoto test can provide insight into price
transmission which is not restricted to the short-run. The only preliminary information
needed before performing the Toda-Yamamoto causality test is the maximum order of
integration of the variables (dm) included in the VAR system. Once the optimal number
of lags (k) is selected for the model, the VAR is specified as a VAR(k + dm). For instance,
if the optimal number of lags is three and the maximum order of integration is one, the
model is specified as a VAR(3 + 1).
The Toda-Yamamoto causality test then follows the same procedure as the Granger
causality test where a Wald test is performed to restrict all of the lags of the selected
explanatory variable up to k to zero. Equation (4) would therefore be modified as
follows:




i¼1 θ3ixt−i þ u3t ð6Þ
The hypotheses of the Toda-Yamamoto test are as follows:H30 : θ31 ¼ θ32 ¼⋯ ¼ θ3k ¼ 0;H3a : At least one θ3 is not zero
whereby the coefficients included in the test go up to k and not dm. The results can
then be interpreted in the same way as the Granger causality results.
Impulse response functions
A weakness of the causality tests is that the values of the coefficients are difficult to in-
terpret within the VAR system therefore these tests cannot tell us anything about the
magnitude of the price transmission, only whether price transmission exists or not. Im-
pulse response functions (IRF) are commonly used to assess what impact each of the
variables included within the VAR system have on one another. It does this by assessing
the error terms of the equations which it sees as shocks. IRFs simulate the effect a
shock originating in one variable has on the other variables in the VAR system and is
able to quantify its impact over proximate time periods. Cholesky factorization is used
to identify where the shocks are coming from which is done using the recursive struc-
ture of the values of the variance-covariance matrix elements to select the restrictions
and therefore identify the origin of the shocks. In other words, the assumption is made
that the shocks from the reduced form equations simulate the structural shocks of the
VAR system.
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IRFs become sensitive to the ordering of the variables within the VAR system if the error
terms are highly correlated. One way to get over this problem is by ordering the variables
from the most exogenous to most endogenous variable within the system. However this re-
quires in depth knowledge of the relationship between the variables. In the case of this
study, it does not seem appropriate to leave it up to the researcher’s a priori judgement on
the exogeneity of the export prices as this is precisely what the study is attempting to test.
A solution is to use the Generalised IRFs as these are not sensitive to the ordering of the
variables, and are therefore used in this study. IRFs can simulate how one variable responds
to a one standard deviation shock in its own stochastic process or any other variable within
the VAR system over a designated number of time periods after the initial shock. IRFs can
therefore provide information on the magnitude of price transmission as well as its persist-
ence and direction. For this study, generalized IRFs will be simulated in the cases where ex-
port prices are found to Granger cause other export prices as they can provide further
information to supplement the causality tests as to the extent of price transmission be-
tween international rice markets.
Preliminary analysis of data
The export prices of five major rice markets are used in this study which were taken
from the Food and Agricultural Organisation’s Global Information Early Warning
System (GIEWS) database. The prices are measured in a common currency, namely
monthly FOB export prices in nominal US dollars. The Thai and Vietnamese prices
are the five per cent broken rice prices, the American price is the two to four per
cent broken price, the Argentinean price is the ten per cent broken price, and the
Pakistani price is the twenty five per cent broken price. The prices are therefore
seen as representing the higher quality indica grades of rice apart from the Pakistani
price. While the higher quality Pakistani price was not available, it is assumed that
the higher quality Pakistan price closely follows price movements in the lower qual-
ity Pakistani price since this is the case for Thai and Vietnamese rice export prices.
The Uruguayan export price is probably a more important rice price for South
American markets than the Argentinean price, however, data was only available from
2006 which would have severely cut the available number of observations included
in the study therefore the study assumes that Argentinean prices are related to Uru-
guayan price movements and are therefore suitable for the analysis. Indian export
prices are also available; however, due to the Indian government’s policy of temporal
rice export bans there are many breaks in the price series therefore Indian prices
cannot be included in the study.
Three unit root tests are used to provide insight into the stationarity of the export
prices. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are seen as
the conventional unit root tests whereas the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) test is also included
as this test considers the existence of a structural break in the time series. An advan-
tage of the ZA test is that it endogenously determines the date of the structural break
rather than leaving it up to the researcher’s judgement to decide on the date. From ob-
serving Figure 1, the behavior of all five price movements suggests that there may have
been a structural break in the time period 2007-2008. A priori knowledge of world




















Figure 1 Monthly export prices of five major international markets: January 2000 to May 2013.
John Agricultural and Food Economics Page 8 of 162014, 2:1
http://www.agrifoodecon.com/content/2/1/1‘food crisis’ when international food commodity prices including rice increased to
unprecedented levels.
According to the result of Table 1, the ADF give mixed results whereby evidence is
found to suggest that the Asian rice prices are stationary while the American and Argen-
tinean prices are I(1) non-stationary processes. On the other hand, the PP tests find all
of the prices to be I(1) non-stationary processes. The ZA results, however, conform to
the ADF results which find the three Asian prices to be stationary processes when con-
sidering the existence of a structural break while the American and Argentinean prices
are non-stationary. Since the power of the conventional unit root test is lowered in the
presence of a structural break (Perron, 1989) the study considers the ZA results to be
the most suitable to follow. Furthermore, since both the ADF and PP results did not find
any of the prices to have a higher order of integration than one, one is considered to be
the maximum order of integration for the Toda-Yamamoto causality procedure.
Results
Two VAR models were specified. The first used the first-differences of the five export
prices while the second contained the prices in their level form. Two VARs wereTable 1 Unit root testsa
Export Price Level First-difference
ADF PP ZA Structural break ADF PP
Thailand 5% −3.380* −2.884 −6.552*** 2008 m02 −7.556*** −7.264***
Vietnam 5% −3.804** −2.796 −6.017*** 2008 m02 −7.251*** −5.923***
Pakistan 25% −3.794** −2.813 −5.692*** 2007 m09 −7.123*** −7.096***
U.S 2-4% −3.102 −2.589 −4.141 2007 m09 −6.984*** −7.025***
Argentina 10% −2.808 −2.422 −4.001 2007 m07 −7.818*** −7.707***
a The time period of the price series is from January 2000 to May 2013. The prices are in their logarithmic
transformations. A trend and intercept were included in the unit root tests. *, **, ***, signify a ten, five, and one percent
level of significance of the unit root tests.
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provide information on the short run price transmission between international rice
markets since this system uses the price changes of the export prices. Meanwhile, the
second VAR system was used for the Toda-Yamamoto causality procedure which can
provide insight into price transmission which was not restricted to the short term.
The Granger causality results are in Table 2. They suggest that short run price trans-
mission exists across the Asian markets with bidirectional price transmission between
Thailand and Vietnam as well as between Pakistan and Vietnam. Price transmission oc-
curs in the short run from Pakistan to Thailand; however, it is not bidirectional. The
Granger test did not find evidence to suggest that Thai prices transmitted to Pakistani
prices in the short run.
Surprisingly, no short run transmission was found between the US and any of the
Asian markets which suggests that the former is completely unrelated to the latter mar-
kets even though their rice markets are of a similar grade and they compete in some of
the same markets in Africa and parts of Latin America. The only market American
price movements responded to in the short run was Argentina; however the price
transmission was not bidirectional. On the other hand, the Argentinean market was
found to be related to two of the Asian markets, namely Vietnam and Pakistan. How-
ever, Argentinean prices did not transmit over to any of the Asian markets, possibly be-
cause the former is dwarfed by the latter markets.
Overall, the most price related markets were Vietnam and Pakistan as they both
transmitted their price movements to all of the other markets apart from the US. In
addition, Vietnam was the only market to respond to the price movements of all of the
other markets except for the US which would suggest that Vietnam is the most suit-
able reference price for international rice prices amongst the five prices, in the short
run at least.
According to the Toda-Yamamoto causality results, price transmission which con-
siders both the short and long-run price movements is similar amongst the Asian mar-
kets vis-à-vis short run price transmission which was tested using the Granger
procedure. What is interesting is that even considering the long run information in theTable 2 Granger causality testsb
Export prices → Thailand → Vietnam → Pakistan → U.S. → Argentina
Thailand→ x 20.494*** 4.265 3.086 1.776
(0.001) (0.385) (0.687) (0.879)
Vietnam→ 17.269*** x 19.656*** 8.238 14.770**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.144) (0.012)
Pakistan→ 12.952** 10.057* x 7.189 11.127**
(0.024) (0.074) (0.207) (0.049)
U.S.→ 1.248 1.483 2.108 x 4.382
(0.940) (0.915) (0.834) (0.496)
Argentina→ 4.013 3.118 5.809 14.838** x
(0.548) (0.682) (0.325) (0.011)
b The figures in the boxes are the Wald test statistics and the p-values are in brackets. *, **, ***, signify a ten, five, and
one percent level of significance of the Granger causality tests. The arrows indicate the direction of price transmission.
According to the Schwarz Information Criterion, the optimal number of lags is one, however five lags are required in
order to ensure the error terms are not serially correlated therefore a VAR(5) model is specified. There are
156 observations.
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to Pakistani prices. Having said that, overall, the results of both causality procedures
suggest that the Asian export markets are affected and respond to each others’ price
movements.
American prices do not transmit over to any of the other export prices even when
considering the long run information of the price series, however, American prices do
respond to the Thai and Vietnamese prices as well as Argentinean prices according to
the Toda-Yamamoto results. This suggests that Asian and US rice prices have been re-
lated over the past decade. However, the Toda-Yamamoto and Granger test results sug-
gest that Asian markets do not respond to North and South American rice prices.
Asian rice prices may therefore be seen as leading the price movements of international
rice prices for other regions which is understandable since Asian rice exports make up
the bulk of world rice trade.
In line with the Granger results, the Toda-Yamamoto tests suggest that Vietnam has
the most far reaching effect on other international rice prices as the results in Table 3
suggest that Vietnamese prices transmit to all four of the other prices included in the
analysis. On the other hand, Thai prices only transmit over to Vietnamese and Ameri-
can prices. The causality results therefore suggest that the Vietnamese price is the most
suitable reference price for international rice prices for the higher quality indica market,
at least.
Generalized impulse response functions were simulated to interpret the magnitude of
price transmission in the cases where price transmission was identified by the Granger
causality tests in the first specified VAR system. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of
shocks transmitting over to other export markets. The Granger causality tests identified
that bidirectional price transmission occurred between Vietnam and Thailand, and
Vietnam and Pakistan. The IRFs suggest that the magnitude of the price transmission
is fairly symmetrical. However, shocks originating in the Vietnamese prices which
transmit over to the Thai and Pakistani prices persist slightly longer than shocks origin-
ating in the latter two countries and transmitting to the Vietnamese market. Even
though the shocks represent the short run effects since it was the price changes which
were used to simulate the IRFs, the magnitude of Vietnamese shocks are statisticallyTable 3 Toda-Yamamoto causality testsd
Export prices → Thailand → Vietnam → Pakistan → U.S. → Argentina
Thailand→ x 28.277*** 9.522 11.105* 2.322
(<0.001) (0.146) (0.085) (0.888)
Vietnam→ 18.652*** x 18.630*** 12.127* 15.591**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.059) (0.016)
Pakistan→ 13.818** 17.082*** x 9.047 9.784
(0.032) (0.009) (0.171) (0.134)
U.S.→ 1.470 0.626 2.184 x 3.555
(0.962) (0.996) (0.902) (0.737)
Argentina→ 3.932 0.920 5.027 15.572** x
(0.686) (0.989) (0.540) (0.016)
d According to the Schwarz Information Criterion, the optimal number of lags is two, however six lags are required in
order to ensure the error terms are not serially correlated therefore a VAR(6 + 1) model is specified. There are 154
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Figure 2 Generalized impulse response functions. The dashed lines represent the critical values of the IRFs.
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shocks in the Vietnamese market are statistically significant for two months.
Pakistani shocks in the Thai market are roughly as significant in magnitude as Viet-
namese shocks, however they only persist for two months, statistically speaking. Al-
though the causality tests found Argentinean prices to transmit over to US prices, the
IRF graph shows that its magnitude is barely significant for the second month after the
original shock. The last two IRF graphs illustrate the impact of Vietnamese and Paki-
stani prices on the Argentinean price. What they show is that while the magnitude of
this transmission is less than a third of the peak of price transmission between the
Asian markets, it is more persistent. For instance, the magnitude of Pakistani and Viet-
namese shocks are statistically significant for the second, third, fifth and sixth months
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respectively.
Perhaps the main finding from the IRFs is that while price transmission occurs be-
tween rice markets in Asia and the Americas, the price transmission between Asian
markets is far greater than price transmission across the continents. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that competition between Asian markets is stronger as they are
competing in most of the same markets.
Discussion and conclusions
The paper set out to examine the extent of price relations between major rice exporting
nations using causality tests and IRFs to test for price transmission. It is generally per-
ceived in the literature that international rice markets have a low level of substitution
which fragments the market and thins out an already thin world rice market. One
would therefore expect the prices of different rice export markets to be unrelated.
Both causality tests and the IRFs suggest that Asian rice export markets are related to
one another. One would therefore not infer that there is a low level of substitution be-
tween these markets which conforms to Ghoshray’s (2008) findings that Thai and Viet-
namese rice export prices are integrated, albeit asymmetrically. In fact, this study’s
results would suggest that they are to some extent competitive which one should ex-
pect since they compete against each other in many of the same markets.
Although the Granger causality tests reported that Asian and US rice prices are not
related in the short term, US prices have, at least over the last decade, responded to
price movements of major Asian export markets, according to the Toda-Yamamoto
causality tests which were not restricted to using the short run price information. The
same results were found for Argentinean rice prices which suggest that the South
American rice prices are related to Asian rice prices. While these findings may conform
to Dawe’s (2008) conclusion, in the short run, that US and Asian rice prices in contem-
porary times are unrelated, the fact that the Toda-Yamamoto causality results found
Asian prices to transmit over to US prices raises some doubt over the view that US and
Asian rice markets function as two separate commodity markets. Dawe (2008) is cor-
rect that the US does not export indica rice to Asian markets but the US does compete
with Asian exporters in some African and Latin American markets, which suggests that
there should be some price relations between American and Asian rice export markets.
What the causality tests show is that Asian rice markets are clearly acting as price
leaders for the other export markets since the direction of price transmission is from
the former and to the latter. This is understandable since the Asian markets are much
larger rice producers and dominate international rice trade. The results also show that
Vietnamese prices affect the price movements of all of the other export markets, which
is not true for Thai prices. This is not necessary contrary to what Ghoshray (2008) re-
ported, namely that between Thailand and Vietnam, the former acts as a price leader. This
study’s results show that price transmission between these two markets is bidirectional
and that the impact according to the IRFs is almost symmetrical. I therefore find no clear
price leader between the two markets. However, since the Vietnamese price exhibits price
relations between all of the other rice export markets included in this study, which cannot
be said for the Thai price, it seems sensible to conclude that the Vietnamese price is a
more suitable reference price for international rice prices than the Thai price.
John Agricultural and Food Economics Page 13 of 162014, 2:1
http://www.agrifoodecon.com/content/2/1/1The results of the study imply that domestic and border policies in major rice export-
ing countries do not inhibit price transmission between many of the rice export mar-
kets covered in this study. It is often argued that rice exporting nations distort their
export price movements and therefore their trade behavior in order to isolate their do-
mestic rice prices from world price fluctuations. In the case of Thailand, John (2013)
reported that while the rice pledging program affects price transmission between Thai-
land’s domestic and export rice markets, price transmission takes place bidirectionally.
However, the impact of price transmission from the export market to the domestic
market is reduced in the short run but then remains rather persistent.
The impact of border and domestic policy on price transmission between markets de-
pends on the type of policy tool used. Intervention mechanisms such as floor prices
could lead to domestic prices being completely unrelated to world prices or being re-
lated in a non linear way (Rapsomanikis, Hallam, and Conforti, 2003). Price transmis-
sion will only take place if the world price is above the domestic floor price. The floor
price will act as a threshold therefore the existence of a floor price may cause price
transmission to be asymmetric. Despite the use of minimum rice export prices in
Thailand and Vietnam, which act as floor prices, the study’s results found these two
markets to be related to each other as well as with other markets. This was despite the
fact that the methods used in this study did not consider the presence of asymmetric
price relationships. This can be explained by the fact that Thai and Vietnamese author-
ities regularly adjust their minimum export prices in order to keep their rice exports
competitive in world markets when they want to release rice stocks. This is precisely
what has happened in Thailand in 2013 as the government has continued to lower their
minimum export prices in order to make their rice export prices more competitive.
While previously, Thailand purposely kept its minimum export prices above world
prices, as the cost of the pledging program has built up and surpassed the $16 billion
allocated to it, the government has been trying to release the rice stocks it accrued
from the rice farmers who participated in the pledging program during 2011 and 2012
in order to recoup part of the cost of the rice pledging program which has cost $8 bil-
lion excluding administrative costs (USDA, 2013).
As previously mentioned, like Thailand, Vietnam uses minimum export prices. How-
ever, it does not subsidize the price the farmer receives for their rice which is what the
pledging program essentially does. The absence of a program similar to the pledging
program in Vietnam may explain why Vietnamese rice export prices are more related
to other export rice markets than Thai prices according to the study’s results. This is
because such a policy would require the government to distort trade volumes through
holding on to vast sums of rice in public stock holds.
It is unsurprising that Pakistan responds to price movements in other Asian rice mar-
kets as it liberalized its rice industry in the later 1990s. US price movements do not
transmit over to the other four export markets. This seems to be a rather puzzling find-
ing at first sight since although it is by no means the largest rice exporter; it is still one
of the top rice exporters in the world. This may be due to the fact that a substantial
amount of rice the US exports is not indica rice but japonica rice. Despite the lack of
price transmission from US rice prices to other export markets, US prices do react to
price movements in the other major rice export markets according to the Toda-
Yamamoto results. There is little reason to doubt these results since the US does not
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world rice prices down by four to six percent (Griswold, 2006). The US would export
far less if not any rice if it was not for it subsidizing its rice farmers.
India was not included in the study; however it is important to mention the impact of In-
dian domestic policy on the price relations of its rice export market with other inter-
national rice markets. Despite being the top rice exporter in recent years, India’s trade
patterns in rice as well as many other food commodities can be erratic as international
markets are seen as a way of offloading surplus stock rather than an opportunity for earn-
ing foreign exchange. India provides its farmers with support prices so Indian farmers
make their business decisions based on these prices rather than international prices. Mini-
mum export prices are used by India and the government also at times uses export bans in
order to secure rice supplies for domestic consumption. Such policies, of course, com-
pletely block any price transmission from other export prices to India’s prices. It seems in-
tuitive; however, that in periods like what India has experienced recently when it has
surplus rice supplies and decides to participate in world rice trade, price transmission oc-
curs as the government drops the minimum export price so their rice prices are competi-
tive with international prices. India’s interventionist policies which impede price
transmission are likely to remain especially with the implementation of the National Food
Security Act passed in parliament in 2013 and involves allocating rice and other grain ra-
tions to over 800 million of its inhabitants.
The world rice market may be a thin market but the study’s results would suggest
that it is not as fragmented as some of the literature proposes, at least when one con-
siders indica rice markets which make up the bulk of world rice production and trade.
This is especially the case for Asian rice export markets. An implication of this is that
large Asian rice exporting nations have the ability to destabilize the international rice
market. In one sense, the study’s results demonstrate that governments of major rice
export markets do not generally distort their export prices to the extent that these
prices remain isolated from other export rice prices. On the other hand, due to the fact
that it is such as thin market, the price distortions of one major rice exporting country
has the ability to destabilize the international rice market as a whole due to the exist-
ence of price transmission between these markets. The unprecedented rise in inter-
national rice prices across the world which peaked in 2008 is a striking example which
has been argued that the actions of India banning non-basmati rice exports was one of
the main causes which initiated the pricing frenzy (Headey, 2011).
To address the concerns of many low income rice import dependent countries, a global
rice reserve has been proposed to help stabilize international rice prices during volatile pe-
riods (Gilbert, 2013). Since this study would suggest that international rice markets do
react to each others’ price movements, particularly in Asia, it may seen appropriate that
any negotiations of forming such a global rice reserve should involve the two largest rice
producers and stockholders, China and India, whereby these countries could play a major
role in stabilizing thin world rice markets rather than being a source of volatility.
Endnotes
a From observations of annual rice trade data from the UN COMTRADE database.
b If c = 0 then the prices across the markets would be identical once the prices had
been converted into a common currency (Rapsomanikis, Hallam, and Conforti, 2003).
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